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THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF AMERICAN
LAWYERS
Adam Bonica*, Adam S. Chilton**, and Maya Seny
ABSTRACT
The ideology of American lawyers has been apersistent source of discussion anddebate.
Two obstacles, however, have prevented this topic from being systematically studied:
the sheer number of attorneys in the USA and the need for a methodology that makes
comparing the ideology of specific individuals possible. In this article, we present a
comprehensive mapping of lawyers’ ideologies that has overcome these hurdles. We
use a new dataset that links the largest database of political ideology with the largest
database of lawyers’ identities to complete the most extensive analysis of the political
ideology of American lawyers ever conducted.
INTRODUCTION
Reflecting on the role of lawyers in the early American democracy, Alexis de
Tocqueville famously wrote, “[i]n America there are no nobles or men of
letters, and the people is apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently
form the highest political class, and the most cultivated circle of society”
(de Tocqueville 1840, p. 514). Noting their political influence, he further
observed that, “[i]f I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I
should reply without hesitation that it is not composed of the rich, who are
united together by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench
and the bar.”
Nearly two centuries later, de Tocqueville’s observations have largely
remained accurate (Posner 2009). In the 113th Congress, 156 of the 435 mem-
bers of the House of Representatives and 55 out of the 100 Senators elected
were lawyers (Manning 2014). Moreover, twenty-five out of forty-three
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Presidents have been lawyers (Slater 2008). Turning to state executive positions,
twenty-four out of the current fifty state governors have law degrees.1 In add-
ition being heavily overrepresented in elected branches of government, lawyers
have the privilege of exclusively occupying an entire branch of government. All
state high court justices are former lawyers, and thirty-two states explicitly
require that their high court justices be former lawyers (Barton 2014, p. 30).
All judges currently serving on the federal courts are lawyers, as are all nine
justices sitting on the Supreme Court.
The influence of the nation’s bar extends from elected politics into policy
making and beyond. For example, by some counts, 8 percent of the nation’s
lawyers work in government (American Bar Association 2012). Lawyers are
also heavily overrepresented among Fortune 500 CEOs and CFOs (Wecker
2012). Within academia, law schools occupy the “crown jewel” positions at
universities such as Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, and UCLA, with large law
faculty and revenue-generating streams (Winterhalter 2013). Moreover,
the American Bar Association has nearly 400,000 members, making it
one of the largest advocacy organizations in the country—behind only
the American Association for the Advancement of Science in terms of
total number of members (American Bar Association 2015). The ABA
is also one of the largest and most powerful lobbying groups in the
United States.
Given the importance of lawyers in American public life, the ideologies of
lawyers is a constant a source of discussion and debate among both aca-
demics and journalists. For example, commentators often discuss whether
law firms are liberal or conservative based on the reputations of a few
prominent partners, or—in perhaps the most comprehensive analysis
prior to this study of the ideology of law firms—based on donations to
two candidates in a single election (Muller 2013). Similarly, the ideologies
of law schools have been examined using proxies like the breakdown of
judges that law students clerk for after graduation (Roeder 2014). As
these examples illustrate, the evidence used to study the ideology of
American lawyers has mostly been anecdotal or incomplete, and systematic
scholarship has remained elusive.
These analyses have remained limited for two reasons. The first reason is
that, given the massive number of attorneys in the USA, any study of the
legal profession as a whole is a daunting task. With more than 1.1 million
law school graduates in America (Brown 2013), conducting a comprehen-
sive analysis of even simple data—addresses, law school attended, practice
1 Based on the biographies of all sitting American governors from Wikipedia on February 6, 2015.
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area, etc.—has been beyond the reach of even sophisticated quantitative
scholars. The second reason is methodological: a systematic analysis of the
legal profession requires developing a way to place individuals on a single,
easily comparable ideological dimension.
We address both of these issues by relying on a new dataset that links the
most comprehensive database of political ideology with the most comprehen-
sive database of lawyers’ identities. Our data on ideological leanings is from the
Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME). The DIME
data leverage the vast number of federal campaign contributions made by in-
dividuals. By scaling not just whom the contributions were made to, but also by
what amount, the DIME data can be used to assess an individual’s ideological
leaning. Our data on the identity of American lawyers is from the Martindale-
Hubbell Legal Directory. Martindale-Hubbell provides the “most comprehen-
sive database of lawyers in the country.”2 By linking the DIME data with the
Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory, we therefore have access to the largest and
most comprehensive dataset ever amassed on the ideological leanings of the
legal profession.
We use this combined data to explore the ideology of American lawyers in
five ways. First, we tackle the question of the ideological leanings of the legal
profession taken as a whole. Second, we consider the relationship between
geography and the ideology of lawyers. Third, we examine the relationship
between lawyers’ educational backgrounds and ideology. Fourth, we explore
how ideology varies across firms and within firms. Fifth, we look at the ideol-
ogies of lawyers by practice area.
We proceed in this article as follows. In Section 1, we motivate our inquiry by
expanding on our observations about the importance of the bar and by dis-
cussing existing studies that examine its ideological positioning. Section 2
begins the discussion of the two datasets that we use in the analysis, which
are (i) the DIME database of campaign contributions for ideological data and
(ii) the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. This section is more technical and
explains how the two databases were linked with each other, as well as possible
sources of bias. In Section 3, we present our basic findings regarding the overall
ideological distribution of attorneys. In the following sections, we disaggregate
the legal profession further. Section 4 disaggregates the ideology of lawyers by
their geographic location. Section 5 analyzes the distribution of lawyers’ ideol-
ogy by their educational experience. Section 6 presents the ideology of lawyers
2 See LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Martindale-Hub
bell+Law+Directory (last accessed January 31, 2015).
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by the law firms where they work. Section 7 explores the ideology of lawyers by
their practice area.
1. STUDYING THE IDEOLOGY OF LAWYERS
We start with the broad issue of the importance of the bar and its role in
American politics and society. We explore these issues in this section by exam-
ining existing studies that have looked at the ideological composition of the bar.
In so doing, we note that much research on this point has suffered from an
absence of clear, comprehensive data. We therefore devote some attention in
this section to explaining how ideological measures have been developed in this
literature as well as in other fields.
1.1 What We Know About Ideology and the Bar
Despite their political importance, we know relatively little about the ideologies
of American lawyers. It is worth contrasting this with how much scholars do
know about other politically important groups. For example, there is a generally
accurate consensus that Congress tilts to the political left or to the political right
depending on electoral outcomes and the public opinion milieu. In fact, scho-
lars have been able to determine these ideological leanings very accurately and
in a dynamic fashion, enabling us to compare the ideologies of different
Congressional sessions and of individual Congressional representatives and
Presidents (see, e.g., Poole et al. 1997; Bailey 2007; Poole & Rosenthal 2007;
Carroll et al. 2009). When it comes to the media, statistical studies too have
quantified political leanings, showing that some news organization are more or
less liberal or conservative in their representation of the news (see, e.g.,
Groseclose & Milyo 2005; Barbera´ & Sood 2014). More recent work has
begun untangling how the public’s ideology varies by jurisdiction; for example,
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) develop estimation techniques that rely on
public opinion survey data and that place localities on an ideological scale.
Perhaps most apropos to the work we do here, research by Bonica has used
campaign contribution data to open up the estimation of ideologies across
different professions (Bonica 2014). For example, Bonica et al. (2014) looked
at the ideologies of the medical profession, finding that some specialties lean
more to the left and others more to the right. Given that the American Medical
Association is a powerful lobbying and professional organization, understand-
ing the ideologies of doctors gives some insight into the potential lobbying and
policy priorities made by that organization. Taken together, this literature is
indicative of significant scholarly advances into the exploration of American
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ideologies, both of the American public and of American political and profes-
sional elites.
However, substantially less is known about the politics of the nation’s law-
yers. Instead, the scholarship that does exist focuses on specific aspects of law-
yers’ ideology and fails to provide a comprehensive picture of the profession as
a whole. For example, within the scholarly literature, some have approached the
question via the lens of judicial selection. Most recently, Bonica and Sen (2015)
posit that since the nation’s judges are drawn from the nation’s pool of attor-
neys, they must somewhat reflective of lawyer ideology. They instead find that
lawyers tilt to the left, while judges tilt to the right. However, because Bonica
and Sen (2015) primarily explore judicial politics, despite using data similar to
the data used in this study, they do not explore lawyers’ ideology specifically.
Additional writing on these issues comes from members of the press and
other public commentators—particularly when the questions turn to the influ-
ence of the bar on national politics. Many conservative commentators have
made the point that lawyers—particularly trial lawyers—appear more liberal
than the rest of the population.
For example, Trial Lawyers Inc. (2003) put together an online report with the
aim of “shedding light on the size, scope and inner workings of America’s
lawsuit industry.” The report comments that:
[I]n the 2002 electoral cycle, members of Williams & Bailey, one of the
largest personal-injury firms in Texas, gave $2.4 million to federal
campaigns; lawyers at securities class action giant Milberg Weiss gave $1.4
million; Baron & Budd, headed by former ATLA president and asbestos
class action lawyer Fred Baron, accounted for $1.1 million; and
prominent asbestos and tobacco litigator Peter Angelos’s firm gave $1.9
million. Each of these firms’ members gave at least 99% of their con-
tributions to Democrats. All told, the litigation industry has contributed
$470 million to federal campaigns since 1990. (emphasis added)
These observations spill over into critiques of the Democratic Party for siding
overwhelmingly with the interest of the bar and of trial lawyers. For example, a
2010 editorial in The Washington Times complained that these liberal ties are
intimately related to liberal-leaning policies, arguing that “the main reason
Democrats don’t include lawsuit reform in their health care proposals is that
they are afraid of angering the plaintiffs’ lawyers. And bill after bill after bill in
the Democratic Congress, on a bewildering variety of issues, contain hidden
provisions that would further enrich those attorneys.”3 In a more scholarly and
3 Why Liberals Are Lawyers’ Puppets, The Washington Times (February. 16, 2010) http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/16/why-liberals-are-lawyers-puppets/.
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systematic analysis of Congressional House votes in which “litigious policy was
the main matter of dispute,” Burke (2004, p. 188) finds that Democrats “voted
for the pro-litigation side on an average of 67 percent of the votes” and
“Republicans 17 percent.” In addition, on several of the votes, “the litigious
policy under review served Democratic objectives and so received the vast
majority of Democratic votes.” Burke concludes that it was “an ideological
struggle, in which liberals typically favored litigious policies and conservatives
opposed them.”
Taken together, these scholarly and journalistic accounts paint a picture of a
liberal-leaning bar. However, a limiting factor in all of these analyses appears to
be data availability. This is understandable: it is difficult enough to accurately
capture individual ideology and all but impossible to do so on a scale massive
enough to capture (even a share of) the population of over one million attor-
neys in the USA. We therefore turn to a more thorough discussion of the
methodological issues involved and how the measures used here fit into this
broader literature.
1.2 Methodological Approaches to Ideology
The first hurdle to developing a comprehensive picture of the ideology of
American lawyers is developing a methodology that allows for the comparison
of ideologies across individuals. This requires having a way to compare the
ideology of specific individuals even if they have not voted on the same
issues (the way that members of Congress do on legislation or Supreme
Court Justices do on cases) and even if they have not donated money to political
candidates in the same election cycle. Although there have not been prior efforts
to develop methods to study the ideology of lawyers specifically, thinking
through ways to rigorously measure ideology generally has been one of the
major projects of political scientists over the last several decades. A great deal
can thus be gained by leveraging the insights that have been developed in those
other areas. To do so, it is worth beginning with the area where the measure-
ment of ideology has been primarily developed: the United States Congress.
Scholars have devised several mechanisms by which to estimate the ideologies
of Congressional actors. The most well-known of the mechanisms is DW-
NOMINATE scores (Poole & Rosenthal 1997; Poole et al. 2011). Under the
assumptions that representatives and Senators cast votes that are close
to their true ideological positioning, the DW-NOMINATE methodology lever-
ages Congressional roll call votes across different issues to measure ideology of
individuals. The method uses the roll call votes of Members of Congress to
collapse ideology into two dimensions: one is believed to be regarding eco-
nomic issues and the other is believed to be regarding social or racial issues.
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These two dimensions appear to go quite far in explaining variance in
Congressional votes.
One methodological issue in estimating these sorts of votes is that
Congressional representatives need to be compared to each other. That is, view-
ing Representative Barney Frank’s (D-MA) votes in isolation is meaningless
when trying to understand his relative ideology. We can only obtain informa-
tion about Frank’s ideological positioning once we compare his voting record
with other representatives—for example, to those of Representative John
Boehner (R-OH). That is, we need multiple representatives to cast votes on
the same issue. Lacking this information means that we must search for a bridge
to compare people against each other. For example, given that Frank retired in
2007, we can still use votes that he cast along with Boehner, and then use
Boehner (and others like him) as a bridge to compare Frank’s record with
those of his successors (with whom he did not overlap).
This strategy of “bridging” means that actors from various institutions—for
example, the Senate and the House, or the 113th House and the 110th House—
can be placed ideologically on a single scale (see, e.g., Bailey 2007). Denoted in
the literature as Common Space Scores, these consistently scaled scores allow
political scientists to compare political actors across various branches of gov-
ernment. This basic insight—that bridging enables the comparison of individ-
ual ideology across time periods and institutions—provides the rough blueprint
for how it can be possible to measure the ideology of American lawyers.
1.3 Methodological Approaches to Ideology in a Legal Context
Lawyers present specific challenges when it comes to estimating ideology. So far,
academics studying the ideology of lawyers have focused on estimating judicial
ideology, most notably the ideologies of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. There are
three reasons for this. First, for many, the Supreme Court represents the pin-
nacle of the American legal system and certainly attracts the most attention
from members of the press and the public. Second, as many have observed,
ideological rifts are becoming more and more palpable (Devins & Baum 2014).
Third, and perhaps most importantly from a methodological perspective, the
Supreme Court sits as an en banc panel of nine judges. This allows scholars to
compare, for example, how Antonin Scalia has voted on the same set of cases as
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. There are consequently fewer obstacles in bridging ideol-
ogies because all nine Justices (or some subset thereof) hear the same set of
cases.
The literature here is well developed. For example, in an influential paper,
Martin and Quinn (2002) developed flexible scores that take into account not
only the Justices’ relative voting compared to each other, but also how their
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relative ideologies could change over time. These Martin-Quinn scores have
shown that justices fluctuate in important ways over the course of their careers,
that certain justices tend to occupy the important “median” justice position,
and that Court rulings can reliably be predicted on the basis of little else besides
the justices’ Martin-Quinn scores. Of course, Martin-Quinn scores are not the
only measures of Supreme Court ideology. For example, Segal and Cover
(1989) have developed scores that rely on newspaper editorials and other writ-
ings at the time of nomination, pinpointing the then-candidate’s (i) qualifica-
tions in tandem with their (ii) perceived ideology. These scores have been
further combined with DW-NOMINATE scores and re-scaled to test additional
theories of judicial behavior (Cameron & Park 2009). Additionally, new research
takes voting-based ideological measurements and combines them with issue-area
voting and text analysis (Bailey 2013; Lauderdale & Clark 2014). An attractive
property of these analyses is that they combine substantive knowledge of legal
issue areas and salience with text-based estimation. These studies show that justices’
ideologies vary not just over time, but also across different kinds of legal questions.
The Supreme Court, however, presents an idiosyncratic example within the
law. Not only do all nine Justices (usually) hear cases together, but the fact that
vacancies are staggered means that we usually have a solid base on which to
“bridge” ideologies across natural courts. The absence of these two features be-
comes a roadblock when we turn to the ideologies of lower court judges or
lawyers where there is no bridging to be done. Thus, for lower court appoint-
ments—including judges serving on courts such as the Federal Courts of
Appeals—a more common strategy for determining judicial ideology is to rely
on the DW-NOMINATE score of the appointing actor. This is usually operatio-
nalized by using the DW-NOMINATE score of either the appointing President
or, in the case where the President and the Senator(s) of the home state are of the
same party, the DW-NOMINATE score of the senior Senator (or some combin-
ation of the two) (Epstein et al. 2007). However, these measures assume that
ideologies across judges appointed by the same Presidents (or same Senators, in
some instances) are constant—a fairly implausible assumption.
For state court judges, the question becomes even more difficult, as the
“identity” of the appointing actors is a state-by-state patchwork of direct elec-
tions, appointments, and elections plus appointments. In this context, the dom-
inant measure of state judge ideology is the PAJID scores developed in Hall,
Brace, and Langer (2000). These scores rely on a combination of elite ideolo-
gical scores combined with public ideology measures. More recently, Bonica
and Sen (2015) and Bonica and Woodruff (2015) have made advancements on
these measures using the DIME data that we also rely on here.
When it comes to the ideology of individuals neither elected nor appointed to
any kind of public office, a common strategy used to estimate the ideologies of
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these actors has been to examine campaign contributions. The logic of this
approach is that contributions are likely made to ideological allies. Using this
method, McGinnis et al. (2005) examined campaign contributions made by law
professors and found that they are overwhelmingly made to left-leaning polit-
ical actors. More recently, Chilton and Posner (2015) found that law professors’
political contributions predict the ideological leanings of their scholarship.
Although using campaign contributions as a proxy for ideology makes it
possible to study individuals who are neither judges nor legislators, it is
worth noting that concerns have been raised with this approach. Perhaps the
primary concern is the possibility of strategic donation—that is, donations that
are made strategically for career purposes or for other kinds of non-ideological
reasons. We will consider this possibility, as well as other concerns, below as we
explain the data we use here and how our measures were developed.
2. DATA AND METHODS
The findings that we present in this article stem from a fruitful combination of
two existing data sources: (i) the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME) and (ii) the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. We discuss
each in turn and then explain how we link the two databases together. While
doing so, we pay specific attention to the challenges raised by problems with
missing data, selection effects, and strategic giving.4
2.1 DIME
As we noted in the previous section, calculating individual ideologies is not only
difficult but requires a massive data collection effort. We therefore use a re-
cently developed data source called the DIME, maintained by Stanford
University (Bonica 2013a). DIME started with the premise of collecting and
standardizing contributions made to campaigns and then ultimately disclosed
under FEC laws. As with other studies that examine campaign contributions
data, the logic behind DIME is that an individual will “put his money where his
mouths is.” That is, we can reasonably expect that an individual will contribute
financial funds toward a political candidate, PAC, or other kind of political
entity that represents his or her political beliefs. Furthermore, we can also
logically expect that the target of donations will be more like their donors—
that is, an entity like the NRA will ideologically be aligned with its many donors
and vice versa. In addition, we further expect that it is not simply the target of
4 For additional technical details, see Bonica & Sen (2015), Bonica & Woodruff (2015), and Bonica
(2014).
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the funds, but also the amount, that reflects underlying ideology (within
FEC campaign contributions limits). For example, we might think that a
$2,000 contribution to Barack Obama indicates at a stronger connection
with Obama’s ideological positioning than would, say, a $5 contribution
to Obama. Thus, contributions can be thought of having both a direction
(in terms of the identity of the contributor and recipient) and also a scale (in
terms of the amount).
Although the machinery of this estimation strategy is described in more
technical detail elsewhere (Bonica 2014), a brief orientation is merited. DIME
takes the campaign contributions data and rescales them by analyzing distances
between various points. The key contribution of the analysis is that it takes
contributions data and rescales them into a single, unidimensional scale that
comports roughly with the standard common space score scale. These
“CFscores” are oriented similarly to NOMINATE scores, with negative values
associated with liberalism and positive values associated with conservatism.
CFscores are also reported for any individual who has made a campaign con-
tribution from 1979 to 2012, representing some “51,572 candidates and 6,408
political committees as recipients and 13.7 million individuals and 1.3 million
organizations as donors” (Bonica 2013b). This means that nearly 5 percent of
the U.S. population is captured in the DIME data.
A potential source of concern could be that some donations are made stra-
tegically—that is, that individuals could be making contributions in ways that
are fundamentally unrelated to their ideological views.5 This is particularly a
concern for those individuals who aspire to occupy a higher office or who view
political support as a strategic tool to another position or for personal advance-
ment. While this concern is legitimate, we note that several factors counsel
against this substantially biasing our results (particularly when we consider
the size of the sample involved). The first is that strategic giving is likely
a concern primarily for those who have the most to gain—like those involved
in political aspects of the legal system. That is, making a strategic choice
in giving might influence how judges, prosecutors, and lawyers interested
in pursing political office decide to contribute. Although this is a sizeable
number of lawyers, it is still fairly small compared to the overall number of
lawyers. Second, even focusing in on this group, the CFscores are robust to
factors known in the political science literature to be related to strategic
giving—such as potentially strategic giving to those candidates who are more
likely to win (Bonica 2014, pp. 373–76). Third, when we constrain the
5 Concerns about strategic giving are discussed at length in Bonica (2014) and Bonica & Woodruff
(2015). Additionally, Bonica & Sen (2015) provide additional discussion of this issue in the context
of judicial ideology.
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sample to only examine those who both receive and make contributions
(e.g., political actors who are eligible to receive campaign contributions), we
find that the CFscores calculated using either contributions received or contri-
butions made yield the same inferences. Taken together, these factors counsel
against the presumption that strategic giving substantially biases the analyses
that we present here. Instead, we believe that the DIME database provides the
best possible source of reliable data for studying the ideology of American
lawyers.
2.2 Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory
DIME provides a wealth of data relating to Americans’ political ideologies.
It does not, however, allow us to identify attorneys or members of the
legal profession. Our next task is therefore to try to uncover the identities
of American attorneys. This is no small feat. To our knowledge, no national
database is kept by the Amrican Bar Association or any other professional
organization. In addition, although many states keep good records of individ-
uals who are licensed to practice law in their state, no such national databases
exist.
Although it is far from perfect, our solution is to turn to private databases for
this information. Specifically, we use the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory.
Founded in 1868, the purpose of the Martindale-Hubbell directory was to
centralize lawyers’ information and make it more accessible for clients and
private individuals looking for legal representation. Although the advent of
the Internet has somewhat obviated the need for the Martindale-Hubbell data-
base, the directory still contains thousands of entries, spanning all fifty states
and practice areas. Given the lack of a national lawyers database, many legal
scholars and journalists have cited the Martindale-Hubbell database as being
one of the more comprehensive directories of American lawyers (see, e.g.,
Young 2008; Whisner 2015).
All entries included in the Martindal-Hubbell directory contain some basic
information. This includes the lawyer’s (i) name, (ii) professional address, (iii)
bar state and admission date, (iv) law school attended, and (v) employer type.
In addition, nearly all of the listings also include (vi) name of law office/firm or
employer, (vii) position/professional title (e.g., partner or associate), (viii)
undergraduate institution, and (ix) specialty/practice areas. Additionally, a sig-
nificant percentage of listings included even more information voluntarily pro-
vided by the lawyer, such as (x) detailed employment history, (xi) judicial
clerkships along with the name of the judge, (xii) lists of prominent clients,
and (xiii) prominent cases argued. Since some lawyers choose to provide more
information and others do not, these last four items are incomplete sources of
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information.6 Furthermore, each listing includes each lawyer’s International
Standard Bar Number (ISBN), which is assigned by the American Bar
Association and remains the same over the course of a lawyer’s career. This
helps assuage concerns that a single lawyer could have multiple entries (and
therefore be biasing our findings).
One caveat to relying on the Martindale-Hubbell database is the possibility of
missingness in the data. To our knowledge, no comprehensive study has
explored the completeness of the data contained or collected in the
Martindale-Hubbell directory. Thus, we do not know whether the directory
systematically underreports or whether some lawyers are more likely to allow
their information to be posted publicly. If data were missing in this way, it could
possibily bias in some of our findings. For example, it could be the case that
more conservative lawyers routinely eschew or disallow their informaton to be
posted. If this were the case, then our analysis would indicate a liberal bias
among the bar even though no bias in fact exists. A similar pattern could be
observed if it were the case that individuals avoided publishing their details for
reasons that are superficially non-ideological but still vary systematically ac-
cording to ideology.
Despite these concerns, for the most part, we believe that attorneys in private
practice are unlikely to opt against being listed in the Martindale-Hubbell dir-
ectory. However, we do note that this incentive might not be constant across all
practice areas. For example, attorneys who operate within the criminal justice
system—for example, public defenders or prosectors—might have less of a need
keep their information in the Martindale-Hubbell directory updated. Lastly, we
note that Martindale-Hubbell does not include in its database those who at-
tended law school but never took the bar exam (in other words, individuals who
could perhaps be considered part of the legal profession even if they are not
practicing attorneys). We have no reason to believe that this would covary with
ideology in a way that would substantially bias our results, but this is an im-
portant caveat to our analyses.
2.3 Linking DIME to Martindale-Hubbell
Our next task was to link these two databases—that is, to locate the corres-
ponding CFscore for the Martindale-Hubbell entries. More technical details of
the approach are described in Bonica and Sen (2015), but this quick overview
will describe our method generally. To link the two databases, we programmed
6 When available, our record-linkage algorithm referenced these last items as a way to augment our
matching algorithm. However, we do not include any information from items (ix) through (xii) in
the main analysis.
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an algorithm to locate and pair up individuals who were located in both
databases.
The algorithm worked as follows. First, the program scanned the DIME
records to identify donors who are listed as attorneys—either via (i) self-
identification as attorneys, lawyers, etc., (ii) identification of their employer
as a recognized law firm or a company or organization identified as “law office,”
“LLP,” etc., or (iii) self-identification with a suffix such as “Esq.,” “J.D.”7
Second, the algorithm then used this information to search the Martindale-
Hubbell directory to search for possible matches, comparing (i) first, last, and
middle names, (ii) suffix or title, (iii) address (city, state, and zip codes), (iv)
firm or employer, and (v) geographic proximity. The matching algorithm was
deliberately calibrated to be “less greedy” so as to minimize the probability of
false matches (e.g., including people who were not attorneys). This was a choice
we made so mimize the likelihood of systematic bias at the expense of possibly
introducing random noise.
We also relied on the Martindale-Hubbell directory information for practice
area; these were compiled from written descriptions provided in each individ-
ual’s listing. Since these lacked structured categeorization, we grouped them
into a more general set of distinct categories using automated content analyses
techniques. We also note that Martindale-Hubbell includes some additionally
potentially useful information. For example, many attorneys in private practice
listed notable or important clients in their profiles. However, because these
sorts of data were provided apparently at the request of the profiled attorney
and not all attorneys provided such data (or did so in a consistent fashion), we
did not use them in our analysis.
Again, we note that one potential area of concern here is selection bias—in
this context, the possibility that some attorneys may appear in one database but
not the other. For example, some attorneys may be active legal professionals but
not active campaign contributors. This would mean they would be absent from
the DIME database and have no corresponding CFscore. Such a scenario raises
concerns not just for the study of lawyers’ ideologies using DIME, but more
broadly for DIME’s use in other contexts (see, e.g., Bonica, Rosenthal, &
Rothman 2014). Fortunately, attorneys are extremely active contributors: 422
362 attorneys in Martindale-Hubbell were also listed in DIME. This corres-
ponds to a donation rate of approximately 43.4 percent.
Although this giving rate is very high—about ten times higher than the
general U.S. population—it could be the case that those attorneys who
donate differ systematically from those who do not. To test for this possibility,
7 Records with titles associated with paralegals or office clerks were screened out.
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we performed several additional analyses that take into account the probability
that an attorney identified in Martindale-Hubbell also appeared in DIME,
comparing the results using selection corrections with results that do not use
such corrections. Although those results are not presented here, they show that
the substantive inferences associated with a larger or smaller CFscore are sub-
stantively identical when using a selection model versus not using one. We
therefore move forward noting that many concerns should be mitigated by
(i) the extremely high donor share in the population and (ii) the fact that
selection models show substantively similar results to what we present here.8
3. BASIC DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS’ IDEOLOGIES
We now turn to exploring the basic data structure and patterns for the overall
population of American lawyers. We do so in three parts. First, we present data
on the overall distribution of the ideology of American lawyers. Second, we put
this information in context by showing the distribution of lawyers’ ideology in
comparison to other well-educated professions. Third, we go further in depth
by showing how various factors—like gender, experience, and practice type—
predict the ideology of American lawyers.
3.1 Overall Distribution of Lawyers’ Ideology
Figure 1 displays the ideological distribution of all American lawyers, oriented
from most liberal (negative on the CFscore scale) to most conservative (positive
on the CFscore scale).9 The histogram bars here—and in subsequent figures
presented in the article—represent frequencies. Taller bars mean that more
lawyers fall within a given ideology, and shorter bars mean that fewer lawyers
fall within a given ideology.
To ground the discussion and to provide additional context, Figure 1 in-
cludes the CFscores of several well-known political figures. On the far left is Alan
Grayson—a Congressman from Florida know for his outspoken liberal views.
On the far right is Ron Paul—a former presidential candidate and Congressman
8 Additional analyses that we do not report indicate that some traits are linked with a higher prob-
ability of being identified in the DIME database. These include, for example, an attorney being older,
male, and being a partner (as opposed to an associate). If anything, these are traits that lead to
attorneys being more likely to be conservative. Because the data show that lawyers tend to be liberal,
this means that, if anything, we are underestimating the degree of liberal bias in the attorney popu-
lation. A fuller test of selection bias via Heckman selection corrections can be found in Bonica & Sen
(2015).
9 A total of 395 254 lawyers are included in Figure 1. The reason that the full 422 362 set of lawyers in
our dataset are not included in Figure 1 is that we excluded lawyers who only gave to corporate or
trade groups. For more informaiton on this decision, see Bonica & Sen (2015).
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from Texas known for his libertarian positions. The political figures placed in
between include Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Hilary Clinton, Chris Christie,
and Mitt Romney.
Figure 1 reveals four important facts about the ideology of American laywers.
First, American lawyers lean to the left of the ideological spectrum. To help
place this in context, the mean DIME score among the attorney population is
–0.31 compared to –0.05 for the entire population of donors. Moreover, some
62 percent of the sample of attorneys are positioned to the left of the midpoint
between the party means for members of Congress. Morover, the modal CFscore
is in the center-left. This places the average American lawyer’s ideology close to
the ideology of Bill Clinton. To be more precise, the modal CFscore for
American lawyers is –0.52 and Bill Clinton’s CFscore is –0.68. This confirms
prior scholarship and journalism that has argued that the legal profession is
liberal on balance. To our knowledge, however, this figure represents the most
comprehensive picture of the ideology of American lawyers ever assembled.
Second, although American lawyers lean to the left, there is a (slight) bimod-
ality to the distribution. Although there is certainly a peak of observations
located around the center-left, there is also a second, smaller peak in the
center-right. In other words, the ideology of American lawyers peaks around
Bill Clinton on the left and around Mitt Romeny on the right.
Third, there is a relative scarcity of observations at both ends of the ideology
spectrum. As Figure 1 clearly shows, very few lawyers are as far left as Alan
Grayson or as far right as Ron Paul. This, of course, does not mean that there
are no lawyers who hold extreme ideological views. In fact, Alan Grayson is a
graduate of Harvard Law School, and Michelle Bachmann is a gradaute of the
O.W. Coburn School of Law.
Fourth, although the fact that few American lawyers hold extreme ideological
positions may suggest that lawyers are generally moderate, it is worth noting
that there are relatively few lawyers in the middle of the distribution. In fact,
there are fewer lawyers who have an ideology around Olympia Snowe (a former
Senator from Maine known for her centrism) than there are around Bernie
Sanders (a Senator from Vermont known for being very liberal) or Paul Ryan (a
Congressman from Wisconsin known for being very conservative).
3.2 Comparing Lawyers to Other Well-Educated Professionals
Although Figure 1 presents how the distribution of the ideology of lawyers
compares to the ideology of prominent political figures, it is difficut to know
exactly how to interpret that information without understanding how other
professions fare on this same scale. In order to provide more context to the
ideology of lawyers, we present the same information alongside the
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distributions for donors from other well-educated professions in Figure 2. The
six other groups of professionals we include here are technology workers; jour-
nalists; academics; accountants; bankers and financial workers; and medical
doctors.10
Figure 2 orders the professions from most liberal (technology workers) to
most conservative (medical doctors). Most obviously, the data presented
in Figure 2 show that there is substantial ideological heterogeneity in the
donor populations across these seven professions. That is to say, there are
well-educated professions—like journalism—that skew to the left, and there
are well-educated professions—like medicine—that skew to the right.
Figure 2 also reveals two facts about the ideology of American lawyers that
are worth noting. First, the ideological distribution of lawyers falls exactly in the
middle of these seven professions. The distributions for technology workers,
journalists, and academics are skewed further to the left. This perhaps confirms
existing beliefs about the types of individuals who are attracted to these pro-
fessions (see, e.g., Mariani and Hewitt 2008). Lawyers as a whole are much more
liberal, however, than three of the professions presented. Indeed, the median
lawyer is well to the left of the respective medians for accountants; bankers and
financial workers; and medical doctors. The difference between those in the
legal profession and those in the banking or finance industry is particularly
revealing, as corporate law firms and finance firms tend to be centered in
comparable metropolitan areas and perhaps draw from the same underlying
pools of potential candidates.11
Second, a smaller percentage of lawyers are at the extreme end of the ideolo-
gical spectrum compared to the other professions shown in Figure 2. For ex-
ample, technology workers, journalists, and academics are all professions with a
sizable percentage of members with a CFscore of less than –1.0. The legal profes-
sion on the other hand, albeit liberal overall, has a much lower percentage of
outlier members who are extremely liberal or extremely conservative.
3.3 Comparing Lawyers Across Other Characteristics
We now turn to examining our subset of lawyers more closely via a simple
regression analysis. Figure 3 graphically presents a regression using a number of
important characteristics of each lawyer to estimate that individual’s CFscore.
10 All professional information is from the DIME database. That is, the information on an individual’s
profession was taken from that individual’s campaign contributions disclosure forms. For additional
information on this process, as well as robustness checks, see Bonica (2014).
11 These differences are demonstrated to be significant using a series of Kolmorov-Smirnov tests, which
check that the shape of the distributions are more different than would be expected due to chance
(Bonica & Sen 2015).
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Figure 2. Overall Distribution of Well-Educated Professions.
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The outcome variable—the individual’s CFscore—is stylized so that a greater
value corresponds with the individual being more conservative. The sample for
this regression includes all those individuals from whom we could reliably
extract both the CFscore as well as these various characteristics.12
Figure 3. Results of Regression Estimating Lawyers’ Ideology.
12 To be more exact, there are 393 240 observations included in this regression.
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In Figure 3, each row represents a different variable included in the regres-
sion. The specific variables that we included in this regression are: (i) gender;
(ii) the number of years since the individual was admitted to the bar; (iii)
whether the individual is identified as a government lawyer, (iv) in-house
counsel, (v) Big Law practitioner, (vi) solo practitioner, (vii) a partner in a
law firm, (viii) a prosecutor or defense attorney, (ix) a public defender, or (x) a
law professor; and (xi) tier of law school attended. Finally, we also include an
additional control in the analysis—CD Rep. Pres. Vote Share—which is district-
level 2008 Republican presidential vote share and serves as a proxy to control
for how conservative (or liberal) a particular jurisdiction where the lawyer lives
happens to be.
For each variable, the dots represent the point estimates from the regression
(i.e., the coefficients), and the lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
When a dot is to the left of the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is
associated with lawyers being more liberal on average; when a dot is to the right
of the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is associated with lawyers
being more conservative on average. All of the estimates are precisely estimated
and are statistically significant at the 0.00001 level (due in part to the large
sample size), meaning that the null hypothesis of no relationship is rejected for
all of the variables.
The results in Figure 3 reveal substantive, meaningful differences even within
the attorney pool. For example, several groups are significantly more liberal
than the average attorney. First, we see the clear pattern that women are more
liberal than men (even when controlling for a number of other salient charac-
teristics like years since bar passage and type of legal employment). This is
consistent with the more general observation that women in America are on
average more liberal than men. Second, government lawyers are more liberal
than non-government lawyers. This difference is comparable in magnitude to
the difference found for gender and is consistent with expectations that gov-
ernment service attracts those who are more sympathetic with the reaches and
aims of government. Third, law professor are more liberal than the attorney
population. This effect is slightly smaller in magnitude than gender or govern-
ment service but fully consistent with earlier studies on the topic (McGinnis et
al. 2005; Chilton and Posner 2015). Additionally, public defenders are more
liberal than other attorneys.
On the other hand, several traits are associated with attorneys being signifi-
cantly more conservative. For example, the number of years since being
admitted to the bar appears to have a strong conservative pull on attorneys.
We also see more conservative individuals being drawn to a career at a Big Law
firm (although the effect is small compared to other effects). Further, being a
law firm partner is associated with being more conservative. This comports with
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what we see for age, which is that, as people advance in their careers, they tend
to be more and more conservative.
In terms of education, the patterns are a bit more mixed and implicate our
next topic, geography. Figure 3 suggests that attending a top fourteen law
school is associated with an individual being more liberal and attending a law
school ranked outside of the top 100 is associated with an individual being more
conservative. However, geography could play an important role with regard to
law schools, with some states’ law schools being more conservative and other
states’ law schools being more liberal.
To assess this, we include district-level 2008 Republican presidential vote
share in the analysis. This variable serves to control for how conservative (or
liberal) a particular jurisdiction happens to be. Including how conservative a
potential district is changes the sign on some of the variables in important ways.
This is most apparent for Big Law attorneys, who cluster in democratic strong-
holds like Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New York City, and San Francisco.
Once we condition on how liberal the district is, however, it becomes clear that
Big Law attorneys are actually more conservative than those around them,
rather than more liberal.
4. IDEOLOGY BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
Our regressions results revealed that the congressional district where an attor-
ney lives is an extremely important predictor of that lawyer’s ideology. This
suggests that there is important geographic heterogeneity in the ideology of
lawyers, and perhaps that the liberal leaning of American lawyers can be ex-
plained in part by where they live. In fact, 65 percent of Big Law attorneys and
44 percent of graduates of elite law schools are located in a select group of ten
congressional districts with Democratic presidential vote shares ranging from
74 to 89 percent.13 We explore how the ideology of American lawyers varies by
geographic location in two ways. First, we examine the ideology of lawyers by
state. Second, we examine the ideology of lawyers in major legal markets.
4.1 Ideology by State
We begin by examining how lawyers’ ideological distributions vary from state
to state. A graphical representation of our analysis is presented in Figure 4. All
13 Those ten congressional districts are DC-01, NY-14, IL-7, NY-08, CA-34, CA-08, GA-05, PA-02,
MA-08, and CA-14.
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fifty states—as well as the District of Columbia—are presented in alphabetical
order.
The plots in Figure 4 demonstrate some substantial geographic sorting, one
that belies the idea that the legal profession is a monolithic liberal group.
Indeed, we see that lawyers skew strongly to the left in a number of states.
For example, in California, the District of Columbia, Michigan,
Massachusetts, and New York, the bulk of the ideological distribution lies sub-
stantially to the left of the CFscore scale. In addition to these states that are
associated with liberal political leanings, there are a few states where the left-
leaning tendencies are perhaps surprising. These include a number of Western
states, such as Alaska, Colorado, and New Mexico. In these states, as in
California or New York, the bulk of the ideological mass lies to the left of
center. This perhaps suggests a more liberal role of the bar in those states.
However, the more interesting patterns develop elsewhere, particularly in
states where the bar is actually quite conservative. In states such as Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas, the average lawyer is conserva-
tive. In some states, such as South Dakota, the pattern is quite extreme. In these
states, the mass of the ideological distribution lies to the right, with fairly little
variance in some cases (e.g., in Oklahoma). These are conservative states to
begin with, and the data suggest that the bar might be quite reflective of the
general ideological distribution of the state of origin.
We also note a handful of states that display genuinely bimodal ideological
distributions. Consider, for example, Arizona. Arizona displays a classic bi-
modal distribution, with approximately half of the “mass” (e.g., number of
observations) over the liberal center and the other half over the conservative
center. The same bimodal distribution is also seen in Ohio and Virginia.
Interestingly, these are also states that are considered to be solidly bellwether
states in terms of Congressional and Presidential elections. The bars in these
states, which are ideologically mixed and bimodal, appear to reflect these
patterns.
We also note one further pattern, which are the handful of states that appear
to conform to a more traditional unimodal ideological distribution. These in-
clude Florida, West Virginia (slightly to the left), and possibly Oklahoma
(slightly to the right).
4.2 Ideology by Major Legal Market
In addition to examining the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by state, we also
examined the distributions by major legal market. We constructed geo-coord-
inates based on addresses in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. We then
mapped the geo-coordinates onto the Current Metropolitan Statistical Area
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(CMSA), which are census-defined geographic regions based on urban areas
with populations of at least 10,000.
Figure 5 reports the ideological distributions of the eight largest legal markets
based on the number of attorneys present in our database. In descending order
based on the number of lawyers in our database, those eight legal markets are
Figure 4. Lawyers’ Ideology by State.
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado
Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho
Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana
Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi
Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey
New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma
Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee
Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Washington D.C.
West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming
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Figure 5. Lawyers’ Ideology by Major Legal Markets.
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New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Washington, D.C.; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA;
San Francisco, CA; Atlanta, GA; and Philadelphia, PA. To be clear, we define
legal markets by metropolitan regions and not city limits. This means that, for
example, lawyers who work in Cambridge, MA, are included as part of the
Boston legal market.
The most important thing worth noting about the data displayed in Figure 5
is that, of the eight largest legal markets, seven have distributions that skew to
the left. The sole exception is Atlanta, GA. In fact, of the top twenty-five largest
legal markets in the USA, only three have more conservative lawyers than liberal
lawyers. Those three markets are: Atlanta, GA; Dallas, TX; and Phoenix, AZ.
5. IDEOLOGY BY EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
We also examined the ideology of American lawyers by their educational ex-
perience. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers who graduated from elite law
schools. Second, we expand our analysis and present the ideology of lawyers
who graduated from fifty prominent law schools. Third, we examine the ideol-
ogy of American lawyers based on the undergraduate institutions from which
they graduated.
5.1 Ideology of Elite Law Schools
To explore the patterns of lawyers’ ideology by educational experience, we first
disaggregate the data by the law school that each attorney attended.14 This infor-
mation is identified on all Martindale-Hubbell entries. As there are more than 200
accredited U.S. law schools, we begin by limiting our analysis to “elite” law schools.
Figure 6 presents the ideological distributions for the top fourteen (T-14) law
schools based on the 2015 U.S. News and World Report rankings.15 Those law
schools (in order of their ranking) are: (i) Yale Law School; (ii) Harvard Law
School; (iii) Stanford Law School; (iv) Columbia Law School; (v) University of
Chicago Law School; (vi) New York University School of Law; (vii) University
of Pennsylvania Law School; (viii) University of Virginia School of Law; (ix)
14 A complete list of the mean CFscores of the 200 law schools with the largest number of alumni
included in our database is presented in Appendix A. These are based on self-reported names of law
schools in the Martin-Dale Hubbell Directory. While compiling APPENDIX A, we excluded cases
where there was ambiguity about the identity of the law schools.
15 The “Top-14” is a commonly used definition of “elite” law schools. Although the rankings have
changed, the same fourteen schools have occupied the top fourteen spots every year since the U.S.
News and World Report started ranked law schools in 1987. See Law School Rankings, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_school_rankings_in_the_United_States#Schools_that_rank_in_the_top_
14_.28aka_.22T14.22.29 (last accessed August 7, 2014).
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University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; (x) Duke
University School of Law; (xi) University of Michigan Law School; (xii)
Northwestern University School of Law; (xiii) Cornell Law School; and (xiv)
Georgetown University Law Center.
The analyses in Figure 6 are again presented as frequency counts, meaning
that some law schools have more graduates than others, and this is reflected in
the heights of the various plots (compared against each other). Importantly,
these represent all the graduates of the various law schools who are in both the
Martindale-Hubbell directory and the DIME database. As a result, to our know-
ledge, Figure 6 is the most comprehensive representation of the ideology of elite
law schools that has ever been compiled.
The most striking result in Figure 6 is that all fourteen top law schools have
distributions that lean to the left. That is, there are more liberal alumni from
those schools than there are conservative alumni. Not only do all of the schools
lean to the left, the skew is fairly extreme in several of the schools. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the University of California, Berkeley has the most liberal lean-
ing distribution of alumni of all the elite law schools. That said, although the
ideology of Berkeley graduates skews the furthest to the left, it is obviously not
the only school with a heavily left skewed distribution. In fact, all of the top six
law schools—Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, Chicago, and NYU—have a
relatively small number of graduates with conservative CFscores.
Of course, there are a few schools with a sizeable percentage of their graduates
with conservative CFscores. Both the University of Virginia School of Law and
Duke University School of Law have a sizeable number of conservative alumni.
To be exact, 37 percent of UVA law alumni have conservative CFscores, and 35
percent of Duke Law alumni have conservative CFscores. The fact that these two
schools have the largest percentage of alumni with conservative CFscores is
perhaps predictable: UVA and Duke are the only top fourteen law schools
that are located in states—Virginia and North Carolina, respectively—that have
voted for Republican presidential candidates in the last decade (although
Obama did narrowly win both states in 2008 and won Virginia in 2012).
Finally, although the University of Michigan Law School certainly leans to
the left, it does have a bimodal distribution that reveals a sizable number of
conservative alumni.
5.2 Ideology of Prominent Law Schools
Of course, there are interesting patterns in ideology outside of the top fourteen
ranked law schools. In Figure 7, we expanded our analysis to the fifty schools
with the most alumni in our database of political donors. The additional
law schools in Figure 7 include many state flagship law schools and other
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Figure 6. Ideology of Alumni from the Top Fourteen Law Schools.
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Figure 7. Ideology of Alumni from Fifty Prominent Law Schools.
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well-known law schools. We have plotted the schools from most liberal (UC-
Berkeley) to the most conservative (University of Alabama).
The more liberal schools comprise several of the top ranked (T-14) law
schools that were presented in Figure 6. These include UC-Berkeley, NYU,
Yale, Stanford, Harvard, Chicago, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania,
and Georgetown University. This suggests that many of the elite law schools are
more liberal than law schools on average. Of course, as previously noted, many
elite law schools are located in exceptionally liberal locations—like New York,
San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago—and their graduates largely work in those
same locations after graduating, so it should perhaps not be surprising that
these schools also have the most liberal alumni.
The most conservative law schools are predominately located in the South.
The two most conservative law schools in Figure 7—Cumberland School of Law
and the University of Alabama—are both located in Alabama. Schools from
South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia round out the top five most conservative
schools.
Although most of the prominent law schools shown in Figure 7 skew to either
the left or to the right, there are a few law schools with notably bimodal dis-
tributions. For example, the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a
near perfectly bimodal distribution with both center-left and center-right peaks.
This perhaps reflects the state of Ohio’s status as an evenly divided swing state
in the past several presidential elections.
5.3 Ideology of Undergraduate Institutions
The Martindale-Hubbell directory also lists where all of the attorneys in their
directory received their undergraduate degree. In Figure 8, we present the dis-
tributions of lawyers’ ideology disaggregated by undergraduate institution at-
tended. We specifically provide data on the fifty institutions that appear most
commonly in our dataset. These institutions are then ordered in Figure 8 from
most liberal (Harvard University) to most conservative (University of Texas).
Of the fifty institutions shown in Figure 8, only five have an average CFscore
that is conservative: University of Oklahoma, Texas A&M University,
University of Georgia, Louisiana State University, and Brigham Young
University. All of the other schools have both average liberal CFscores and
median liberal CFscores. There are, however, a number of schools with a sizable
percentage of their graduates that have conservative CFscores. These schools
include Michigan State University, University of Notre Dame, University of
Florida, Indiana University, and Ohio State University.
Another interesting pattern is that the four most liberal universities on
this list are also some of the traditionally highest ranked undergraduate
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Figure 8. Ideology of Lawyers by their Undergraduate Institutions.
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institutions: Harvard, Stanford, Cornell, and Yale. In other words, regardless of
what law school they attended, lawyers who attended these undergraduate in-
stitutions are much more liberal than conservative on balance.
6. IDEOLOGY BY LAW FIRMS
We now turn to examining the heterogeneity of lawyers’ ideology by the law
firms at which they work. Perhaps unlike firms in other professions, law firms
are often perceived to be liberal or conservative. These perceptions emerge both
from the clients and cases that firms take on as well as from the political affili-
ations of the firms’ high-profile attorneys. As a result, one incredibly useful
outcome from our efforts to combine the DIME dataset of political ideologies
with the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers is that it allows us to generate
rigorous estimates of the ideologies of major law firms in the USA.
We use our data to explore the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by the law
firms they work at in three ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers by the
size of the law firm at which they work. Second, we examine the ideology of
specific law firms. Third, we investigate the differences in ideology between
associates and partners at major law firms.
6.1 Ideology by Firm Size
Figure 9 presents the ideology of lawyers based on the size of the law firm at
which they work. The figure is broken into five categories. The first three
categories are all attorneys who work in “Big Law”16: attorneys who work at
one of the twenty-five largest law firms in the USA, attorneys who work at law
firms that are 26th through 100th in size, and attorneys who work at law firms
that are 101 through 200th in size. The fourth category shown is lawyers who
work in small practices.17 The final category shown is lawyers who work in solo
practices.18
The first thing to note is that, like the population of lawyers overall, all five
categories have liberal-leaning distributions. The most liberal leaning of the five
categories is the first: attorneys who work at one of the twenty-five largest law
16 Law firms are ranked by the number of attorneys who list the firm as their employer in the
Martindale-Hubbell directory. The rankings are consistent with other rankings of the largest U.S.
law firms based on the number of employees. See e.g., Internet Legal Research Group, America’s
Largest 250 Law Firms http://www.ilrg.com/nlj250 (last accessed February 17, 2015).
17 Small practices are defined as private law practices where two or more lawyers list as an employer but
are not large enough to be included in our list of the 350 largest law firms.
18 Solo practices are identified as law practices that are listed as employers for no more than one lawyer
in the database.
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Figure 9. Ideology of Lawyers by Law Firm Size.
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firms. Attorneys in this category have a mean CFscore of –0.49 and a median
CFscore of –0.74. It is worth mentioning that of these twenty-five law firms,
twenty-two are headquartered in states where Obama won in the 2012 presi-
dential election.19
The second most liberal category is attorneys who work at the 26th through
100th largest firms. In fact, attorneys who work at these firms have a nearly
identical distribution of ideologies to attorneys who work at the twenty-five
largest law firms. The mean CFscore for attorneys who work at the 26th through
100th largest firm is –0.45, and the median CFscore is –0.68.
Attorneys who work at the 101st through 200th largest law firms still lean to
the left, but the distribution is closer to bimodal. The mean CFscore for these
attorneys is –0.27, and the median CFscore is –0.47. Moreover, while the top
twenty-five largest law firms are overwhelmingly concentrated in large, liberal
cities like New York and Chicago, the 101st through 200th largest law firms
have headquarters spread across the country in both liberal and conservative
cities.
Finally, attorneys who work in small practices or have solo practices have
fairly similar ideological distributions. Both lean to the left but also have a
number of attorneys with center-right CFscores. The mean CFscore for attorneys
in small practices is –0.29, and the median CFscore is –0.49. The mean CFscore
for attorneys in solo practices is –0.30, and the median CFscore is –0.51.
6.2 Ideology of Specific Firms
To further explore the ideology of attorneys working in private practices, we
examined the ideological breakdown of American lawyers by specific law firms.
The Martindale-Hubbell directory includes the law firm that lawyers listed
within their directory listing. This then allows us to estimate the ideology of
specific law firms by aggregating the CFscores for all of the attorneys who have
made political donations who work at that firm.
There are, however, a few caveats that should be noted. First, the ideology of
specific law firms that we report on is the mean CFscores for all attorneys listed
as working at that firm by the Martindale-Hubbell database when we compiled
our dataset.20 This means that the ideology score for each law firm is based on
the CFscore for attorneys who worked at that law firm at that specific point in
time. Second, the ideology reported for each firm is the mean CFscore for all
19 The three firms headquartered in states that Obama did not win in 2012 are Bryan Cave (St. Louis,
MO), King & Spalding (Atlanta, GA), and Vinson & Elkins (Houston, TX).
20 The data we use from the Martindale-Hubbell directory are based on the information listed in the
directory for 2012.
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attorneys who work at that firm. We do not weigh the relative seniority of the
attorneys in any way, which means that 100 associates are counted the same as
100 partners in determining a firm’s ideological ranking. Finally, the ideology
score we present does not represent the official ideology of the firm, or the
ideology of clients that they represent. It is possible that a firm could appear as
having a liberal ideology based on our rankings due to a large number of liberal
associates despite having conservative firm leadership and a conservative client
base.
With those caveats in mind, we turn to presenting the ideology ratings of
major law firms within the USA. To our knowledge, this is the most compre-
hensive ideological picture of American law firms ever developed. In Appendix
B, we present the mean CFscore for all of the 350 law firms with the most
attorneys in our dataset.21 In the following tables, however, we present the
results for four groups of firms that may be of particular interest: (i) the
twenty most prestigious firms; (ii) the twenty largest firms; (iii) the twenty
most liberal firms; and (iv) the twenty most conservative firms.
6.2.1 The Twenty Most Prestigious Law Firms.
Table 1 presents the results for the firms that Vault ranked as the twenty most
prestigious law firms in USA for 2015. Each year, Vault releases rankings of law
firms based on surveys of attorneys who work at firms that have been highly
ranked in previous years. For the 2015 edition of the rankings, over 17,000
attorneys participated in Vault’s anonymous survey.22 Although the Vault rank-
ings have been criticized, they are widely viewed and discussed by both the
popular press and legal scholars (see, e.g., Ciolli 2005; Aronson 2007; Estlund
2011).
As Table 1 shows, all twenty of the law firms ranked as being the most
prestigious by Vault have a mean CFscore that is liberal. The most liberal of
these twenty firms is Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, which has a mean
CFscore of –0.953. This is roughly comparable to the CFscore of Hilary Clinton
(–1.16). This perhaps comports with the popular perception of Quinn
Emanuel—the firm is known for having a unique culture that embraces wearing
flip flops and working remotely from around the world.
21 This means that our list is not identical to a ranking of the 350 largest law firms by either total
attorneys or total revenue. Instead, our list is the 350 law firms that have the most attorneys who
appear in both the DIME database and the Martindale-Hubbell directory.
22 For more on the methodology that Vault uses to rank law firms http://www.vault.com/company-
rankings/law/vault-law-100//RankMethodology?sRankID¼2&rYear¼2015&pg¼1 (last accessed
January 19, 2015).
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The most conservative law firm in Table 1 is Jones Day, with a CFscore of
–0.213. Even though this is the most conservative CFscore of the Vault Top
20 most prestigious firms, it is still a (slightly) liberal score that is
roughly comparable to that of Democratic West Virginia Senator Joe
Manchin (–0.13). Although Jones Day is listed as having its largest
office in New York, Jones Day officially does not have a headquarters. The
firm’s moderate ideology can perhaps be in part explained by the fact that
Jones Day was founded in Cleveland, and the firm maintains a strong presence
there, as well as having offices in many traditionally moderate and conservative
states.
It is worth noting that all twenty of these prestigious law firms have their
largest offices in one of four cities: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or
Washington, D.C. In fact, the largest office of fifteen of the twenty prestigious
law firms is located in New York. Given the fact that all four cities are over-
whelmingly Democratic, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that these firms all have
liberal average CFscores as well.
6.2.2 The Twenty Largest Law Firms.
In addition to analyzing the most prestigious law firms, we also analyzed the
data for the largest law firms. To identify the largest law firms, we relied on the
Table 1. Ideology of the “Vault” Top Twenty Law Firms
Lam firm Largest office Ideology
1 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz New York –0.478
2 Cravath, Swaine & Moore New York –0.684
3 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom New York –0.629
4 Sullivan & Cromwell New York –0.492
5 Davis Polk & Wardwell New York –0.601
6 Simpson Thacher & Bartlett New York –0.719
7 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton New York –0.940
8 Weil, Gotshal & Manges New York –0.534
9 Kirkland & Ellis Chicago –0.363
10 Latham & Watkins New York –0.561
11 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Los Angeles –0.297
12 Covington & Burling Washington, D.C. –0.612
13 Boies, Schiller & Flexner New York –0.783
14 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison New York –0.764
15 Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan New York –0.953
16 Debevoise & Plimpton New York –0.815
17 Sidley Austin Chicago –0.608
18 Williams & Connolly Washington, D.C. –0.735
19 Jones Day New York –0.213
20 White & Case New York –0.494
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list of the largest U.S. Law Firms published in 2014 by Law360.23 To be included
in the list, the law firms must be based in the USA. The rankings are based on the
total number of attorneys working for the firm within USA, and the number of
attorneys are taken from either the firms’ websites or the Martindale-Hubbell
directory. Table 2 presents the mean CFscores for the twenty largest U.S. law firms
according to Law360.
Although there is some overlap, fourteen of the firms in Table 2 did not
appear in the list of the twenty most prestigious firms listed in Table 1. The lists
are similar in one important respect though: all have a liberal mean CFscore.
With a score of –0.837, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr is the most
liberal firm on the list. Once again, Jones Day is the most conservative firm on
the list with a score of –0.213.
It is also worth noting that the firms represented in Table 2 are from a more
diverse set of cities than the firms listed in Table 1. In fact, the firms in Table 2
have their largest offices in twelve different cities. That said, although these
cities are more diverse, Obama won the states in which all twelve cities are
located in the 2012 presidential election.
6.2.3 The Twenty Most Liberal Law Firms.
Table 3 presents the results for the twenty law firms that have the most liberal
mean CFscores. To be clear, these twenty firms are not necessarily the twenty
most liberal in the country. Instead, of the 350 firms that have the most attor-
neys in our database, these twenty have the most liberal CFscores.
Of these twenty firms, only three appear in Table 1 or Table 2: Quinn
Emanuel and Cleary Gottlieb appeared in the list of the twenty most prestigious
firms presented in Table 1, and Wilmer Hale appeared in the list of the twenty
largest law firms presented in Table 2. The most liberal firm in Table 3 is
BuckleySandler. With a mean CFscore of –1.193, BuckleySandler has a similar
ideology score to Hillary Clinton (who has a CFscore of –1.16). The twentieth
most liberal firm in the list is Foley Hoag. With a mean CFscore of –0.819, Foley
Hoag has a similar ideology score to Bill Clinton (who has a CFscore of –0.68).
6.2.4 The Twenty Most Conservative Law Firms.
Table 4 presents the results for the twenty law firms that have the most con-
servative mean CFscores. Once again, just like with the liberal firms, these are the
23 See Jake Simpson, Law360 Reveals 400 Largest US Law Firms, LAW360, March 23, 2014, http://www.
law360.com/articles/518950/law360-reveals-400-largest-us-law-firms (last accessed January 19,
2015).
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Table 3. Ideology of the Twenty Most Liberal Law Firms
Lam firm Largest office Ideology
1 BuckleySandler Washington, D.C. –1.193
2 Farella Braun+Martel San Francisco –1.076
3 Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan New York –0.953
4 Morrison & Foerster San Francisco –0.943
5 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton New York –0.940
6 Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd San Diego –0.939
7 Hanson Bridgett San Francisco –0.937
8 Fenwick & West Mountain View –0.92
9 Goulston & Storrs Boston –0.919
10 Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney Chicago –0.917
11 Davis & Gilbert New York –0.897
12 Wiggin and Dana New Haven –0.885
13 Munger, Tolles & Olson Los Angeles –0.881
14 Arnold & Porter Washington, D.C. –0.868
15 Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe San Francisco –0.853
16 Kenyon & Kenyon New York –0.853
17 Schiff Hardin Chicago –0.839
18 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Washington, D.C. –0.837
19 Leonard, Street and Deinard Minneapolis –0.824
20 Foley Hoag Boston –0.819
Table 2. Ideology of the Twenty Largest Law Firms
Lam firm Largest office Ideology
1 Jones Day New York –0.213
2 Greenberg Traurig New York –0.426
3 Sidley Austin Chicago –0.608
4 Latham & Watkins New York –0.561
5 Kirkland & Ellis Chicago –0.363
6 DLA Piper Chicago –0.674
7 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom New York –0.629
8 K&L Gates Pittsburgh –0.562
9 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Philadelphia –0.385
10 Reed Smith Pittsburgh –0.443
11 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Los Angeles –0.297
12 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Washington, D.C. –0.837
13 Holland & Knight Tampa –0.382
14 Bryan Cave St. Louis –0.331
15 Hogan Lovells Washington, D.C. –0.585
16 Littler Mendelson San Francisco –0.502
17 Perkins Coie Seattle –0.675
18 Ropes & Gray Boston –0.711
19 McGuireWoods Richmond –0.225
20 Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith Los Angeles –0.417
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twenty firms that have the most conservative CFscores of the 350 firms that have
the most attorneys in our database.
None of the twenty firms listed in Table 4 appeared in the list of the most
prestigious firms in Table 1 or the largest firms in Table 2. Additionally, these
firms are from a different set of cities than the firms from Tables 1–3. The firms
in Table 4 are overwhelmingly from states that Obama lost in the 2012 presi-
dential election. The four exceptions are the two firms located in Michigan (#2
Warner Norcross and Judd and #7 Varnum) and the two firms located in Ohio
(#16 McDonald Hopkins and #20 Taft, Stettinius and Hollister).
It is also worth noting that the most conservative firm in Table 4—Butler,
Snow, O’Mara, Stevens, and Cannada—has a less extreme average CFscore than
the three most liberal firms presented in Table 3. Additionally, the twentieth most
conservative firm in Table 4—Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister—has a much more
moderate CFscore than the twentieth most liberal firm in Table 3. In fact, with a
mean CFscore of 0.31, Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister has a mean ideology compar-
able to that of centrist Republican Senator Olympia Snowe from Maine (0.29).
6.3 Ideology of Partners versus Associates
Of course, not all of the attorneys who work at a given law firm have ideologies
that match the firm average. In fact, within many of the firms there are likely to
be cleavages along a number of key dimensions. One key dimension we further
Table 4. Ideology of the Twenty Most Conservative Law Firms
Lam firm Largest office Ideology
1 Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada Ridgeland (MS) 0.943
2 Warner Norcross & Judd Grand Rapids (MI) 0.658
3 Balch & Bingham Birmingham (AL) 0.572
4 Kirton McConkie Salt Lake City 0.508
5 Burleson Houston 0.467
6 Phelps Dunbar New Orleans 0.452
7 Varnum Grand Rapids (MI) 0.449
8 McAfee & Taft Oklahoma City 0.447
9 Krieg DeVault Indianapolis 0.446
10 Cox Smith Matthews San Antonio 0.435
11 Jones, Walker, Waechter New Orleans 0.423
12 Kelly Hart & Hallman Fort Worth 0.422
13 Hall Booth Smith & Slover Atlanta 0.400
14 Miller & Martin Chattanooga 0.387
15 Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, & Berkowitz Memphis 0.365
16 McDonald Hopkins Cleveland 0.364
17 Jackson Walker Dallas 0.340
18 Winstead Dallas 0.326
19 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite Phoenix 0.320
20 Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister Cincinnati 0.310
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explore in this section is the ideology of law firm associates compared to law
firm partners. Figure 10 shows the disaggregated average ideology for associates
and partners at 30 major law firms.24
There are three patterns worth noting in Figure 10. First, at all thirty of these
law firms, the partners are more conservative than the associates on average.
This can likely be explained at least in part by the fact that partners are more
likely to be older, richer, male, and white than the associates at their firms. All
four of these characteristics are associated with conservative political leanings.
Second, the differences between the average CFscores for associates and part-
ners at these thirty law firms are relatively small. There are several possible
explanations for this phenomenon. First, law students may choose to go
work for law firms where the partners’ political leanings are close to their
own. Second, law firms extend offers to law students who they believe share
their views (either based on the activities listed on their resumes or the views the
student expressed during interviews). Third, new associates may adopt the
views of other attorneys at their law firm over time. Fourth, both partners
and associates have political ideologies that reflect the cities where they live—
either because of selection bias or acculturation—and associates and partners in
the same city are likely to share similar views. We believe that all four of these
explanations are plausible and not mutually exclusive.
Third, very few of these firms have conservative partners or associates. There
are only three firms where the partners have an average CFscore that is conser-
vative. Those firms are Baker Botts, Fullbright & Jaworski, and Vinson & Elkins.
Notably, all three firms are based in Houston, TX. Moreover, there are only two
firms where the average CFscore for associates is conservative: Baker Botts and
Vinson & Elkins. Even though these firms are conservative on average, their
CFscores are still fairly moderate. To put things in perspective, there are eleven
firms whose partners have an average CFscore more liberal than –0.50, but not a
single one of these firms has a CFscore more conservative than 0.50.
7. IDEOLOGY BY PRACTICE AREA
There are likely considerable differences in the ideologies of lawyers based on
the type of law that they practice. For example, it would be reasonable to
hypothesize that, on average, lawyers who specialize in mergers and acquisitions
24 The firms studied are the thirty firms that have the most lawyers included in our database. There are
two reasons for focusing on the firms with the largest number of lawyers in our database. First, our
estimates are likely to be more reliable when they are based on a larger number of observations.
Second, firms with larger numbers of attorneys in our database are also well-known firms that are
likely to be of interest to readers.
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have different political views than lawyers who specialize in immigration law.
We explore the ideological distributions of lawyers based on the kind of law
they practice in two ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers based on the
area of law in which they claim to specialize. Second, we examine the ideology
of lawyers who work as public defenders and prosecutors.
7.1 Ideology by Practice Area Overall
We begin by examining the ideology of lawyers based on their practice area. To
do so, we rely on the practice areas that are listed on attorneys’ profiles in the
Figure 10. Ideology of Associates Compared to Partners.
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Martindale-Hubbell directory. It is important to note that some lawyers in the
directory do not have any practice areas listed while other lawyers in the dir-
ectory have several listed. Moreover, the available categories may not be con-
sistently used. For example, even if two lawyers both work on the same deals,
the practice area for one attorney may be listed as “Mergers & Acquisitions”
while another may be listed as “Corporate Law.” Finally, it may be the case that
missing practice area information is not random. In other words, our data on
practice areas may be biased because this information may not be equally likely
to be available for all attorneys.
With these caveats in mind, examining the relationship between practice area
and lawyers’ ideology can still reveal interesting—although imperfect—
information. Figure 11 presents the regression results that estimate the
CFscores of lawyers while including variables for the forty-eight practice areas
that appear most commonly in the Martindale-Hubbell database. In addition to
the variables for practice areas, the regression also includes all of the variables
included in the regression presented in Figure 3 as controls. As with Figure 3,
the regression results presented in Figure 11 are presented graphically—the dots
for each variable are the point estimates and the line is the 95% confidence
interval. Variables where the confidence interval does not cross the vertical line
are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Estimates to the left of the vertical
line mean that the variable is associated with more liberal CFscores, and esti-
mates to the right of the vertical line mean that the variable is associated with
more conservative CFscores.
It is important to note, however, that Figure 11 reports regression results that
control for a number of key characteristics of the lawyers included in the re-
gression. In other words, a practice area with a negative (positive) coefficient
means that lawyers with that practice area listed on the Martindale-Hubbell
directory are likely to be more liberal (conservative) than a similarly situated
lawyer who practices in another area. What it does not mean is that the lawyers
working in that practice area are all liberal (conservative).
In Figure 11, the forty-eight practice areas included in the regression are listed
from most conservative to most liberal. Seventeen of the practice areas are
associated with more conservative CFscores in a statistically significant way.
The most conservative of which is oil and gas law. Additionally, sixteen of the
practice areas are associated with more liberal CFscores in a statistically significant
way. The practice that predicts the most liberal CFscore is entertainment law.
7.2 Ideology of Prosecutors versus Defense Attorneys
As a final examination of the ideology of American lawyers, we explored the
political leanings of individuals who are either public defenders or prosecutors.
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Figure 11. Ideology of Lawyers by Practice Area.
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To do so, we subset our database based on how the lawyers identified their title
or employer. Public defenders were identified as anyone who listed their pro-
fession as being a “defender.”25 Prosecutors were identified as anyone who
listed their profession as being related to a district attorney, state’s attorney,
or attorney general.26 Although this process is not perfect, it did produce a
sample of over 1300 public defenders and a sample of over 6000 prosecutors.
The ideologies of these two groups of attorneys are reported in Figure 12.
There are several things worth noting about the patterns revealed in
Figure 12. First, unsurprisingly, public defenders lean far to the left. The
mean CFscore for public defenders is roughly –1.00, which is comparable to
Hillary Clinton CFscore. Additionally, there are many public defenders who
have views that are on the extreme end of the distribution. In fact, the modal
CFscore for public defenders is greater than –1.5 (roughly comparable to the
ideology of liberal congressman Alan Grayson). That said, there are some
Figure 12. Ideology of Public Defenders and Prosecutors.
25 To be more precise, we searched our combined dataset for the following phrases: “Defenders A,”
“Fed. Def,” “Capital Def,” “Federal Defenders,” “Defender,” or “Capital Def.”
26 We specifically searched our data for the following terms: “Atty. Gen.,” “Dist. Atty.,” “Asst. Atty.
Gen.,” “Atty. General,” “State Atty. Off.,” “Asst. State Atty.,” “Co. Atty’s. Off.,” “Atty. Gen.,” or
“State’s Atty.”
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conservative public defenders. To be exact, roughly 17.5 percent of public de-
fenders in our dataset have CFscores that are to the right of center. Although
there are very few conservative public defenders, the fact that it is not a null set
may be surprising to some readers.
Second, although they do not lean as far to the left as public defenders, pros-
ecutors are still liberal. In fact, prosecutors are more liberal than lawyers overall.
The mean CFscore for prosecutors is roughly –0.50. This is slightly to the left of
lawyers overall (–0.31), which is perhaps surprising given the contrast that is often
drawn between public defenders being liberal and prosecutors being conservative
(see, e.g., Smolla 2005; Folsom 2013). This complicates any narrative that suggests
that conservatives are drawn to prosecution while liberals are drawn to public
defense. It is also worth noting that the ideological distribution of prosecutors is
closer to being bimodal. In fact, 34 percent of prosecutors have CFscores to the
right of center (compared to just 17.5 percent of public defenders). Taken to-
gether, our data reveals that although public defenders are more liberal than
prosecutors, both groups are still more liberal than lawyers overall.
CONCLUSION
We conclude where we started, with the idea that lawyers occupy an extremely
prominent role in American politics and society. As a result, how the bar op-
erates—its partisan inclinations and ideological proclivities—is especially im-
portant. In total, lawyers control two-thirds of the three branches of the federal
government. Understanding how this population as a whole behaves is not only
descriptively interesting, but also illuminating in terms of understanding the
influence wielded by this very significant group.
In this article, we have leveraged two massive datasets to offer a comprehen-
sive analysis of the ideology of American lawyers. The first dataset is the DIME
database at Stanford University. The DIME database uses data on campaign
contributions to place individuals on a single ideological scale. We then linked
these data to the second dataset, which is the famous Martindale-Hubbell dir-
ectory, which captures a comprehensive snapshot of the nation’s attorneys.
Doing so enables us to explore in a systematic fashion the ideological leanings
of nearly half a million U.S. attorneys. We do so using one consistent scale
(CFscores), which places these attorneys on a single, ideological dimension and
allows us to compare attorneys as a whole to other political actors, attorneys to
other professions, graduates of various law schools to each other, and within
and across law firms.
Using the novel dataset we created by combining the DIME database and the
Martindale-Hubbell directory, we have completed what we believe to be the
most comprehensive look into the ideology of American lawyers ever
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conducted. Our results not only confirm existing conventional wisdoms, but
also reveal heterogeneity within the profession that previously has gone unex-
plored. In short, our results reveal the political ideologies of America’s “highest
political class” (de Tocqueville 1840, p. 514).
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APPENDIX A: IDEOLOGY OF THE 200 LAW SCHOOLS WITH
MOST DONORS
Appendix A.
Law school Mean
Albany Law School –0.270
American University –0.834
Appalachian School of Law 0.090
Arizona State University –0.194
Ave Maria University 0.555
Barry University –0.157
Baylor University 0.040
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law –0.839
Birmingham Law School 0.023
Boston College –0.820
Boston University –0.930
Brigham Young University 0.828
Brooklyn Law School –0.780
California Western School of Law –0.445
Campbell University –0.079
Capital University –0.041
Case Western Reserve University –0.521
Catholic University –0.624
Chapman University –0.159
Charlotte School of Law –1.333
Chicago Kent College of Law –0.712
City University of New York –0.758
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law –0.327
Columbia University –0.882
Cornell University –0.785
Creighton University –0.613
Cumberland University 0.382
DePaul University –0.824
Dickinson Law –0.337
Drake University –0.259
Drexel University –0.402
Duke University –0.605
Duquesne University –0.144
(continued)
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Appendix A. Continued
Law school Mean
Emory University –0.556
Florida A & M University –0.505
Florida Coastal School of Law –0.086
Florida State University –0.207
Fordham University –0.773
Franklin Pierce Law Center –0.417
George Mason University –0.253
George Washington University –0.841
Georgetown University –0.821
Georgia State University –0.151
Golden Gate University –0.941
Gonzaga University –0.404
Hamline University –0.380
Harvard University –0.816
Hofstra University –0.598
Howard University –1.170
Indiana University Bloomington –0.713
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis –0.025
John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, GA –0.131
John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL –0.626
Lewis & Clark Law School –1.048
Louisiana State University 0.278
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles –0.400
Loyola University –0.551
Marquette University –0.502
University of Massachusetts –0.717
McGeorge School of Law –0.713
McGill University –0.583
Mercer University 0.137
Michigan State University –0.178
Mississippi College School of Law 0.192
Nashville School of Law 0.116
National University –0.299
University of New England –0.558
New York Law School –0.658
North Carolina Central University –0.503
Northeastern University –1.072
Northern Illinois University –1.261
Northwestern University –0.839
University of Notre Dame –0.196
Nova Southeastern University –0.224
New York University –0.950
Ohio Northern University 0.059
Ohio State University –0.222
Oklahoma City University 0.131
Pace University –0.410
Pennsylvania State University –0.154
Pepperdine University –0.308
Quinnipiac University –0.410
Regent University 0.264
Roger Williams University –0.386
(continued)
Winter 2016: Volume 8, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 325
 at Serials D
epartm
ent on N
ovem
ber 21, 2016
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Appendix A. Continued
Law school Mean
Rutgers University –0.661
Saint Louis University –0.752
Salmon P. Chase College of Law –0.026
San Francisco Law School –0.980
San Joaquin College of Law –0.041
Santa Clara University –0.816
Seattle University –0.938
Seton Hall University School of Law –0.467
South Texas College of Law –0.080
Southern Illinois University –0.634
Southern Methodist University 0.029
Southern University –0.377
Southwestern Law School –0.733
St. John’s University, Collegeville, MN –0.301
St. John’s University, New York, NY –0.483
St. Louis University –0.661
St. Mary’s University School of Law 0.047
St. Thomas University School of Law –0.147
Stanford University –0.878
State University of New York at Buffalo –0.413
Stetson University 0.015
Suffolk University –0.637
Syracuse University –0.618
Temple University –0.701
Texas Tech University 0.236
Texas Wesleyan University 0.047
Thomas Jefferson University –0.171
Thomas M. Cooley Law School –0.204
Thurgood Marshall School of Law –0.962
Touro College –0.560
Tulane University –0.563
University of Akron –0.123
University of Alabama 0.066
University of Arizona –0.776
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville –0.237
University of Arkansas, Little Rock –0.290
University of Baltimore –0.519
University of California, Berkeley –1.155
University of California, Davis –0.812
University of California, Los Angeles –0.941
University of California, Hastings –1.125
University of Chicago –0.833
University of Cincinnati –0.226
University of Charleston 0.333
University of Colorado, Boulder –0.829
University of Connecticut –0.654
University of Dayton 0.028
University of Denver –0.769
University of Detroit –0.364
University of Florida –0.214
(continued)
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Appendix A. Continued
Law school Mean
University of Georgia –0.185
University of Hawaii –0.593
University of Houston –0.149
University of Idaho 0.212
University of Illinois –0.865
University of Iowa –0.688
University of Kansas –0.391
University of Kentucky 0.039
University of La Verne –0.428
University of Louisville –0.118
University of Maine –1.013
University of Maryland –0.768
University of Miami –0.376
University of Michigan –0.776
University of Minnesota –0.907
University of Mississippi 0.406
University of Missouri –0.197
University of Missouri, Kansas City –0.450
University of Montana –0.630
University of Nebraska –0.005
University of New Hampshire –0.140
University of New Mexico –0.853
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill –0.391
University of North Dakota 0.229
University of Oklahoma 0.062
University of Oregon –1.047
University of Pennsylvania –0.865
University of Pittsburgh –0.386
University of Richmond –0.482
University of San Diego –0.256
University of South Carolina 0.171
University of South Dakota 0.061
University of Southern California –0.851
University of St. Thomas 0.070
University of Tennessee, Chattanooga –0.443
University of Tennessee, Knoxville –0.267
University of Texas, Austin –0.165
University of Toledo –0.052
University of Toronto –1.006
University of Tulsa –0.109
University of Utah –0.487
University of Vermont –0.758
University of Virginia –0.719
University of Washington –1.005
University of West Los Angeles –0.451
University of Wisconsin –0.843
University of Wyoming 0.426
Valparaiso University –0.183
Vanderbilt University –0.556
Villanova University –0.394
(continued)
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APPENDIX B: IDEOLOGY OF 350 LARGE AMERICAN LAW
FIRMS
Appendix A. Continued
Law school Mean
Wake Forest University –0.349
Washburn University –0.151
University of Washington –0.806
Washington and Lee University –0.401
Washington University in St. Louis –0.738
Wayne State University –0.311
West Virginia University –0.204
Western New England –0.620
Western State University –0.308
Whittier College –0.461
Widener University –0.229
Willamette University –0.571
William & Mary –0.414
William Mitchell College of Law –0.680
William S. Boyd School of Law –0.332
Yale University –0.913
Appendix B.
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Adams and Reese New Orleans 0.149
Adelson, Testan, Brundo & Jimenez Van Nuys, CA –0.504
Akerman Senterfitt Miami –0.18
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld Washington, D.C. –0.318
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis Los Angeles –0.484
Alston & Bird Atlanta –0.149
Andrews Kurth Houston 0.216
Archer & Greiner Haddonfield, NJ –0.439
Arent Fox Washington, D.C. –0.509
Armstrong Teasdale St. Louis –0.122
Arnall Golden Gregory Atlanta 0.061
Arnold & Porter Washington, D.C. –0.868
Arnstein & Lehr Chicago –0.771
Baker & Daniels Indianapolis –0.082
Baker & Hostetler Cleveland –0.122
Baker & McKenzie Chicago –0.429
Baker Botts Houston 0.283
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz Memphis 0.365
Balch & Bingham Birmingham, AL 0.572
(continued)
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Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Ballard Spahr Philadelphia –0.578
Barnes & Thornburg Indianapolis 0.165
Bass, Berry & Sims Nashville 0.035
Becker & Poliakoff Fort Lauderdale –0.325
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff Cleveland 0.13
Best Best & Krieger Riverside, CA –0.283
Bingham Greenebaum Doll Indianapolis 0.229
Bingham McCutchen Boston –0.762
Blank Rome Philadelphia –0.157
Bodman Detroit –0.111
Boies, Schiller & Flexner New York –0.783
Bond, Schoeneck & King Syracuse, NY 0.063
Bowman and Brooke Minneapolis –0.263
Bracewell & Giuliani Houston 0.099
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings Birmingham, AL 0.285
Bricker & Eckler Columbus, OH 0.093
Briggs and Morgan Minneapolis –0.338
Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione Chicago –0.49
Broad and Cassel Orlando –0.222
Brown Rudnick Boston –0.628
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck Denver –0.44
Bryan Cave St. Louis –0.331
Buchalter Nemer Los Angeles –0.57
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney Pittsburgh –0.203
BuckleySandler Washington, D.C. –1.193
Burleson Houston 0.467
Burns & Levinson Boston –0.625
Burr & Forman Birmingham, AL 0.215
Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada Ridgeland, MS 0.943
Butzel Long Detroit –0.054
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft New York –0.495
Cahill Gordon & Reindel New York –0.458
Calfee, Halter & Griswold Cleveland 0.143
Carlton Fields Tampa –0.322
Chadbourne & Parke New York –0.537
Chapman and Cutler Chicago –0.5
Choate, Hall & Stewart Boston –0.716
Clark Hill Detroit –0.12
Clausen Miller Chicago –0.316
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton New York –0.94
Cohen & Grigsby Pittsburgh 0.084
Cole, Scott & Kissane Miami –0.114
Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel,
Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer
Hollywood, FL –0.565
Cooley Palo Alto –0.548
Covington & Burling Washington, D.C. –0.612
Cox Smith Matthews San Antonio 0.435
Cozen O’Connor Philadelphia –0.509
Cravath, Swaine & Moore New York –0.684
Crowe & Dunlevy Oklahoma City 0.181
Crowell & Moring Washington, D.C. –0.67
(continued)
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Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Crowley Fleck Billings, MT –0.18
Cullen and Dykman Garden City, NY –0.246
Curtis, Mallet–Prevost, Colt & Mosle New York –0.488
Davis & Gilbert New York –0.897
Davis Graham & Stubbs Denver –0.669
Davis Polk & Wardwell New York –0.601
Davis Wright Tremaine Seattle –0.646
Day Pitney Hartford –0.564
Debevoise & Plimpton New York –0.815
Dechert Philadelphia –0.455
Dewey & LeBoeuf New York –0.789
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote Pittsburgh –0.053
Dickinson Wright Detroit 0.012
Dickstein Shapiro Washington, D.C. –0.412
Dinsmore & Shohl Cincinnati 0.208
DLA Piper Chicago –0.674
Dorsey & Whitney Minneapolis –0.629
Dow Lohnes Washington, D.C. –0.255
Downey Brand Sacramento –0.587
Drinker Biddle & Reath Philadelphia –0.41
Duane Morris Philadelphia –0.326
Dykema Gossett Chicago –0.016
Eckert Seamans Pittsburgh –0.057
Edwards Wildman Palmer Boston –0.685
Epstein Becker & Green New York –0.576
Faegre & Benson Minneapolis –0.604
Farella Braun+Martel San Francisco –1.076
Fennemore Craig Phoenix 0.157
Fenwick & West Mountain View –0.92
Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner Washington, D.C. –0.423
Fish & Richardson Boston –0.629
Fisher & Phillips Atlanta 0.22
Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto New York –0.376
Foley & Lardner Milwaukee –0.341
Foley & Mansfield Minneapolis –0.57
Foley Hoag Boston –0.819
Ford & Harrison Atlanta –0.042
Foster Pepper Seattle –0.654
Fowler White Boggs Tampa 0.058
Fox Rothschild Philadelphia –0.365
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy New York –0.574
Fredrikson & Byron Minneapolis –0.664
Freeborn & Peters Chicago –0.139
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson New York –0.674
Frost Brown Todd Cincinnati 0.225
Fulbright & Jaworski Houston 0.026
Gardere Wynne Sewell Dallas 0.102
Gibbons Newark, NJ –0.299
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Los Angeles –0.297
Godfrey & Kahn Milwaukee –0.335
(continued)
330 ~ Bonica, Chilton, Sen: Political Ideologies of American Lawyers
 at Serials D
epartm
ent on N
ovem
ber 21, 2016
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Goldberg Segalla Buffalo, NY –0.339
Goodwin Procter Boston –0.747
Gordon & Rees San Francisco –0.593
Goulston & Storrs Boston –0.919
Gray Plant Mooty Minneapolis –0.778
GrayRobinson Orlando 0.207
Greenberg Traurig New York –0.426
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale St. Louis –0.563
Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart West Palm Beach 0.081
Hahn Loeser & Parks Cleveland –0.071
Hall Booth Smith & Slover Atlanta 0.4
Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman Indianapolis 0.306
Hanson Bridgett San Francisco –0.937
Harness, Dickey & Pierce Troy, Michigan 0.166
Harris Beach Rochester, NY –0.084
Harter Secrest & Emery Rochester, NY –0.13
Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young LLP Atlanta –0.053
Haynes and Boone Dallas 0.131
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd Greenville, SC 0.241
Herrick, Feinstein New York –0.639
Hinckley, Allen & Snyder Boston –0.507
Hinshaw & Culbertson Chicago –0.365
Hiscock & Barclay Syracuse, NY 0.201
Hodgson Russ Buffalo –0.292
Hogan Lovells Washington, D.C. –0.585
Holland & Hart Denver –0.596
Holland & Knight Washington, D.C. –0.382
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn Detroit 0.265
Howard & Howard Royal Oak, MI –0.043
Hughes Hubbard & Reed New York –0.662
Hunton & Williams Richmond 0.11
Husch Blackwell St. Louis –0.319
Ice Miller Indianapolis 0.274
Irell & Manella Los Angeles –0.602
Jackson Kelly Charleston, WV 0.195
Jackson Lewis LLP Los Angeles –0.3
Jackson Walker Dallas 0.34
Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell Los Angeles –0.516
Jenner & Block Chicago –0.785
Jones Day New York –0.213
Jones, Walker, Waechter New Orleans 0.423
K&L Gates Pittsburgh –0.562
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman New York –0.36
Katten Muchin Rosenman Chicago –0.759
Kaufman & Canoles Norfolk, VA –0.002
Kaye Scholer New York –0.68
Kean Miller Baton Rouge 0.308
Kelley Drye & Warren New York –0.495
Kelly Hart & Hallman Fort Worth 0.422
Kenyon & Kenyon New York –0.853
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton Atlanta –0.221
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Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
King & Spalding Atlanta –0.097
Kirkland & Ellis Chicago –0.363
Kirton McConkie Salt Lake City 0.508
Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear Irvine –0.063
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel New York –0.626
Krieg DeVault Indianapolis 0.446
Kutak Rock Omaha –0.229
Lane Powell Seattle –0.561
Latham & Watkins New York –0.561
Lathrop & Gage Kansas City, MO –0.075
Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi San Francisco –0.813
LeClairRyan Richmond –0.265
Leonard, Street and Deinard Minneapolis –0.824
Lewis and Roca Phoenix –0.414
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith Los Angeles –0.417
Lewis, Rice & Fingersh St. Louis –0.428
Lindquist & Vennum Minneapolis –0.652
Litchfield Cavo Chicago –0.397
Littler Mendelson San Francisco –0.502
Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell Dallas 0.124
Loeb & Loeb New York –0.779
Lowenstein Sandler Roseland, NJ –0.595
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps San Diego –0.004
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips Los Angeles –0.64
Margolis Edelstein Philadelphia –0.211
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin Philadelphia –0.097
Mayer Brown Chicago –0.503
Maynard, Cooper & Gale Birmingham, AL 0.102
McAfee & Taft Oklahoma City 0.447
McCarter & English Newark, NJ –0.311
McDermott Will & Emery Chicago –0.455
McDonald Hopkins Cleveland 0.364
McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter Morristown, NJ –0.169
McGlinchey Stafford New Orleans 0.201
McGuireWoods Richmond –0.225
McKenna Long & Aldridge Atlanta –0.17
McKool Smith Dallas –0.253
McNair Law Firm Columbia, SC 0.181
McNees Wallace & Nurick Harrisburg –0.014
Michael Best & Friedrich Milwaukee –0.117
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy New York –0.492
Miles & Stockbridge Baltimore –0.062
Miller & Martin Chattanooga 0.387
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone Detroit –0.008
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo Boston –0.706
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp Los Angeles –0.738
Moore & Van Allen Charlotte, NC –0.06
Morgan & Morgan Orlando –0.511
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Philadelphia –0.385
Morris, Manning & Martin Atlanta 0.078
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Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Morrison & Foerster San Francisco –0.943
Morrison Mahoney Boston –0.563
Munger, Tolles & Olson Los Angeles –0.881
Murtha Cullina Hartford, CT –0.484
Neal Gerber & Eisenberg Chicago –0.741
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough Columbia, SC 0.025
Nexsen Pruet Columbia, SC 0.239
Nixon Peabody Boston –0.508
Norris McLaughlin & Marcus Bridgewater, NJ –0.265
Nossaman Los Angeles –0.441
Nutter McClennen & Fish Boston –0.643
Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver Baltimore –0.351
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart Greenville, SC –0.029
O’Melveny & Myers Los Angeles –0.696
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe San Francisco –0.853
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein Charlotte, NC –0.283
Parsons Behle & Latimer Salt Lake City –0.216
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler New York –0.743
Patton Boggs Washington, D.C. –0.279
Paul Hastings New York –0.362
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison New York –0.764
Pepper Hamilton Philadelphia –0.385
Perkins Coie Seattle –0.675
Phelps Dunbar New Orleans 0.452
Phillips Lytle Buffalo –0.414
Pierce Atwood Portland, Maine –0.43
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman Washington, D.C. –0.532
Plunkett Cooney Bloomfield Hills, MI –0.018
Polsinelli Shughart Kansas City, MO –0.301
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur Columbus, OH 0.197
Post & Schell Philadelphia –0.178
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch San Diego –0.404
Proskauer Rose New York –0.6
Pryor Cashman New York –0.555
Quarles & Brady Milwaukee –0.352
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan New York –0.953
Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer Miami –0.376
Rawle & Henderson Philadelphia 0.081
Reed Smith Pittsburgh –0.443
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren Milwaukee –0.042
Reminger Cleveland 0.196
Richards, Layton & Finger Wilmington, DE –0.083
Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti Morristown, NJ –0.203
Rivkin Radler Uniondale, NY –0.182
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd San Diego –0.939
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Minneapolis –0.817
Robinson & Cole Hartford –0.662
Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson Charlotte, NC 0.033
Roetzel & Andress Akron 0.28
Ropes & Gray Boston –0.711
Rutan & Tucker Costa Mesa –0.08
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Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite Phoenix 0.32
Saul Ewing Philadelphia –0.354
Schiff Hardin Chicago –0.839
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis Philadelphia –0.444
Schulte Roth & Zabel New York –0.697
Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt Portland, OR –0.342
Sedgwick San Francisco –0.347
Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney Chicago –0.917
Selman Breitman Los Angeles –0.755
Seward & Kissel New York –0.549
Seyfarth Shaw Chicago –0.632
Shearman & Sterling New York –0.578
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton Los Angeles –0.249
Sherman & Howard Denver –0.563
Shipman & Goodwin Hartford –0.593
Shook, Hardy & Bacon Kansas City, MO –0.271
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick Toledo 0.194
Shutts & Bowen Miami –0.158
Sidley Austin Chicago –0.608
Sills Cummis & Gross Newark, NJ –0.418
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett New York –0.719
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom New York –0.629
Smith Moore Leatherwood Greensboro 0.042
Smith, Gambrell & Russell Atlanta 0.133
SmithAmundsen Chicago –0.526
Snell & Wilmer Phoenix –0.055
SNR Denton New York –0.62
Spilman Thomas & Battle Charleston, WV 0.066
Squire Sanders Cleveland –0.154
Steptoe & Johnson LLP Washington, D.C. –0.298
Steptoe & Johnson PLLC Charleston, WV –0.29
Stevens & Lee Reading, PA –0.113
Stinson Morrison Hecker Kansas City, MO –0.426
Stites & Harbison Louisville 0.033
Stoel Rives Portland, OR –0.715
Stoll Keenon Ogden Lexington, KY 0.22
Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young Philadelphia –0.34
Strasburger & Price Dallas 0.292
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan New York –0.523
Sullivan & Cromwell New York –0.492
Sullivan & Worcester Boston –0.41
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan Atlanta –0.18
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister Cincinnati 0.31
Thompson & Knight Dallas 0.227
Thompson Coburn St. Louis –0.272
Thompson Hine Cleveland –0.178
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons Dallas 0.249
Tressler Chicago –0.362
Troutman Sanders Atlanta –0.031
Ulmer & Berne Cleveland –0.09
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Appendix B. Continued
Law firm Headquarters Mean
Varnum Grand Rapids, MI 0.449
Vedder Price Chicago –0.248
Venable Washington, D.C. –0.374
Vinson & Elkins Houston 0.223
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease Columbus, Ohio 0.028
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz New York –0.478
Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis Nashville –0.053
Warner Norcross & Judd Grand Rapids, MI 0.658
Weil, Gotshal & Manges New York –0.534
White & Case New York –0.494
White and Williams Philadelphia –0.258
Whiteford, Taylor & Preston Baltimore –0.643
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford Miami –0.063
Wiggin and Dana New Haven –0.885
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer Woodbridge, NJ –0.534
Wiley Rein Washington –0.027
Williams & Connolly Washington –0.735
Williams Mullen Richmond 0.082
Willkie Farr & Gallagher New York –0.578
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Washington, D.C. –0.837
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker New York –0.406
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Palo Alto –0.658
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf New York –0.346
Winstead Dallas 0.326
Winston & Strawn Chicago –0.382
Wolff & Samson West Orange, NJ –0.219
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice Winston-Salem, NC –0.093
Wood Smith Henning & Berman Los Angeles 0.028
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Louisville, KY 0.089
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